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There is little doubt that Nietzsche was a major influence on 
Heidegger. In his work Nietzsche, however, Heidegger is guilty of 
nothing less than a gross misinterpretation of Nietzsche— 
specifically on the issue of the eternal return. This misinterpretation 
arises out of an attempt to appropriate Nietzsche and reinterpret 
him in such a way that he is rendered a prelude to Heidegger's 
own philosophy. Whether willful or not, Heidegger 's mis-
interpretation of the eternal return is the result of his reckless 
interpretive method, his failure to consider the many facets of 
Nietzsche's thought, and his insistence on interpreting Nietzsche 
on purely metaphysical grounds. 
The goal of Heidegger's analysis of Nietzsche is to first prove 
that the eternal return was a metaphysical doctrine, and second, 
not only to harmonize this interpretation with the rest of Nietzsche's 
philosophy, but to attempt to prove that this harmonization lies at 
the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy as the revaluation of all values. 
"The doctrine of the eternal return of the same coheres in the most 
intimate way with that of will to power. The unity of these teachings 
may be seen historically as the revaluation of all values hitherto" 
(Heidegger 118). This however is quite an undertaking since, on 
close examination, the eternal return and the will to power seem 
mutually exclusive; for, the eternal return would 'cap,' or conclude, 
the infinitely variable flux of the will to power as always 
becoming—often described by Nietzsche in appealing to 
Heraclitus. 
Heidegger discusses this in relation to Alfred Baeulmer. He 
quotes Alfred Baeumler's claim that "only one can be valid: either 
the doctrine of eternal return or the doctrine of will to power" and 
adds to that, "According to Baeumler's account, the doctrine of 
eternal recurrence implies bringing Becoming to a standstill. With 
his either/or, Baeumler presupposes that Heraclitus teaches the 
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eternal flux of things, in the sense of the ever-ongoing" (122). But 
what other way is there to interpret Heraclitus? Heraclitus did not 
say "one can't step into the same river twice... that is, until the 
same river returns" for the whole point of his aphorism is that the 
same river will never return. Consider Richard Geldard's mature 
interpretation of Heraclitus: 
All things change, is one idea. All things are in flux is 
another. If things changing are also in flux, then the 
condition is totally fluid. The change is changing. 
Opposites are only momentarily in tension; they next 
become identical, as one thing becomes another before 
either can be identified as one thing or another. My joy 
contains sorrow even before its sweetness can be fully 
savored. (Geldard 52) 
This reading of Heraclitus resonates acutely with Nietzsche's 
project of life affirmation (to be discussed later) and the whole of 
his philosophy. It therefore seems to be exactly what Nietzsche 
had in mind when he referenced Heraclitus, in contrast to 
Heidegger's interpretation. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger maintains that, not only are the two 
doctrines reconcilable, but their reconciliation is the very heart of 
Nietzsche's philosophy. 
Now, if we do not thoughtfully formulate our inquiry in 
such a way that it is capable of grasping in a unified way 
the doctrines of the eternal return of the same and will to 
power, and these two doctrines in their most intrinsic 
coherence as revaluation... then we will never grasp 
Nietzsche's philosophy (117). 
The coherence of the two is then understood in terms of the nature 
of being such that: 
The determination "will to power" replies to the question 
of being with respect to the latter's constitution; the 
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determination "eternal recurrence of the same" replies to 
the question of being with respect to its way to be. Yet 
const i tu t ion and manner of being do cohere as 
determinations of the beingness of beings (II199). 
But why could 'the way' of being not just as easily be, not 
recurrence, but an eternal and ever changing flux? Here Heidegger 
is being more or less dogmatic and offers nothing to justify this 
claim. Moreover, this presents Heidegger with a problem; such a 
claim contradicts the general understanding of being described by 
Heraclitus in the traditional interpretation—the same one 
presumably affirmed by Nietzsche. 
Therefore, Heidegger regularly appeals to what has been called 
'the recapitulation aphorism' in attempting to distance Nietzsche's 
conception of becoming from the traditional Heraclitean conception 
so that Nietzsche's conception of becoming can be harmonized 
with Heidegger's conception of Being. 
Nietzsche does not cling to such a position [the character 
of beings is Becoming]—although that is usually what we 
are thinking when we associate him with Heraclitus. Much 
to the contrary, in a passage purposely and expressly 
formulated to provide an encompassing overview (WM, 
617), Nietzsche says the following: "Recapitulation: To 
stamp Becoming with the character of Being—that is the 
supreme will to power." This suggests that Becoming only 
is if it is grounded in Being as Being: "That everything 
recurs is the closest approximation of a world of Becoming 
to one of Being:—peak of meditation" (119). 
The recapitulation aphorism serves as the justification for 
Heidegger's ontological rendering of Nietzsche's eternal return. 
This metaphysical interpretation proceeds as follows: 
"Recurrence" thinks the permanentizing of what becomes, 
thinks it to the point where the becoming of what becomes 
is secured in the duration of its becoming. The "eternal" 
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thinks the permanentizing of such constancy in the 
direction of its circling back into itself and forward toward 
itself. Yet what becomes is not the unceasing otherness of 
an endlessly changing manifold... Nietzsche's thought 
links the constant permanentizing of the becoming of 
whatever becomes into the only kind of presence there 
is—the self-recapitulation of the identical... The thought 
of return is not Heraclitean in the sense usually expounded 
by our historians of philosophy (III 164-165). 
Heidegger cannot deny the influence of Heraclitus on Nietzsche, 
nor can he deny the conflict that arises between the traditional 
interpretation of Heraclitus and his rendering of Nietzsche; thus 
in order to appropriate Nietzsche, he must first appropriate 
Heraclitus. One additional point of consideration: if Nietzsche 
was working with something other than the t radi t ional 
understanding of Heraclitus, why didn't he ever discuss this? The 
truth is, Heidegger achieves the metaphysical unity of the eternal 
return and the will to power only by misinterpreting both Nietzsche 
and Heraclitus. Regardless, Heidegger conceives of this unity as 
follows: 
If being as such is will to power and thus eternal return 
Becoming, and if will to power demands end-lessness and 
excludes endless progress toward an end itself; if at the 
same time the eternal Becoming of will to power is 
delimited in its possible configurations and constructs of 
domination, because it cannot be new unto infinity; then 
being as a whole as will to power must permit the same to 
recur and must be an eternal return of the same. This 
"circuit" embodies the "primal law" of beings as a whole, 
if being as such is will to power (III 211-212). 
Thus, for Heidegger, it 's only through metaphysically 
harmonizing the eternal return with the will to power that the true 
meaning of the will to power reveals itself. In Heidegger's words, 
"What is will to power itself, and how is it? Answer: the eternal 
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recurrence of the same" (I 19). To which he adds: "Whoever 
neglects to think the thought of eternal recurrence together with 
will to power, as what is to be thought genuinely and 
philosophically, cannot adequately grasp the metaphysical content 
of the doctrine of will to power in its full scope" (I 21). This is 
quite a revolutionary conclusion to draw—but a conspicuously 
suspicious conclusion in that, not only does the conclusion rely on 
controversial readings of both Heraclitus and Nietzsche, but it is 
based entirely on one single note in a collection of unpublished 
notes for which the purpose can never be known definitively. 
Moreover, Heidegger resigns his discussion of Nietzsche to 
purely metaphysical grounds—"Like all Western thought since 
Plato, Nietzsche's thinking is metaphysics" (III 187). But Nietzsche 
was much more than a metaphysician (if he can be called one at 
all), and operated on many levels. This bias of Heidegger causes 
him to misread the recapitulation aphorism and, consequently, the 
whole of Nietzsche's philosophy, for it is all interpreted by 
Heidegger through the lens of the recapitulation aphorism—making 
the eternal return the center of Nietzsche's thought. 
In opposition to all the disparate kinds of confusion and 
perplexity vis-a-vis Nietzsche's doctrine of return, we must 
say at the outset, and initially purely in the form of an 
assertion, that the doctrine of the eternal return of the same 
is the fundamental doctrine in Nietzsche's philosophy (II 
6). 
More than jus t a philosopher, however, Nietzsche was a 
psychologist and a religious investigator as the title of Kaufman's 
book, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, reminds us. Thus any 
doctrine or thought of Nietzsche's has the potential to operate on 
multiple levels and must be considered, not just metaphysically, 
but psychologically. Heidegger misinterpreted Nietzsche as the 
'last metaphysician' when it was in fact metaphysics that Nietzsche 
rebelled against. This makes Nietzsche unique in the philosophical 
tradition and demands that he be treated uniquely. Thus, Nietzsche 
is radically misunderstood if he is forced into the framework of 
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the rest of the continental tradition—that is, if he is 'systematized,' 
which is exactly what Heidegger attempts to do. Heidegger sought 
to 'domesticate' Nietzsche's thought—in other words, take his 
words, and his truths, merely at face value. But it is only through 
the unadulterated instincts of thought (i.e. the natural balance of 
Dionysiac and Apolline elements, or passion and reason), so to 
speak, that Nietzsche reveals his truths. Thus Nietzsche defies 
systematization, and irony, satire and sarcasm are his greatest 
allies—all of which unfortunately lends him all too easily to 
misinterpretation by those who are intellectually cheap or 
superficial. Moreover, it is ironic to attempt to systematize him in 
that, not only did Nietzsche consider himself 'a-systematic,' but 
his primary concern—his entire project—was to deconstruct and 
undo the intel lectual domest icat ion begun by Pla to and 
Christianity—the 'improvers' of mankind. 
The question, however, remains: how then should we treat the 
recapitulation aphorism? First, one must consider it in light of 
certain aspects of human nature discussed by Nietzsche—one must, 
that is, examine it psychologically. First Nietzsche observes, "Need 
for communication as necessary for human survival led to the 
falsification of reality" (GS 354) and thus where humans are 
concerned "the conditions of life might include error" (GS 121) 
because of the crooked path the will to power has taken in human 
all too human expression. "As the most endangered animal, he 
needed help and protection, he needed his peers, he had to learn to 
express his distress and to make himself understood.... thinking 
takes the form of words" (GS 354). But words corrupt reality. 
"He [man] really thought that in language he possessed knowledge 
of the world... A great deal later—only now—it dawns on men 
that in their belief in language they have propagated a tremendous 
error (HH 11)." This error of practical convention has caused the 
will to power to express itself in a corrupted form in humans such 
that "stamping being on becoming" has proved advantageous and 
therefore become the highest expression of the will to power in 
human life. But this does not change the fact that the will to power 
as an unadulterated metaphysical expression in fact defies being— 
as Nietzsche says "there is no being, only becoming." Thus, the 
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recapitulation aphorism applies to human psychology but not 
metaphysics as Heidegger interprets it. 
Moreover, Heidegger insists on interpreting even the 
'difficulty' of thinking the eternal return in terms of metaphysics— 
that is, in terms of being and time. 
When he thinks "the most difficult thought" at the "peak 
of meditation," Nietzsche thinks and meditates on Being, 
that is, on will to power as eternal recurrence. Thinking 
Being, will to power, as eternal return, thinking the most 
difficult thought of philosophy, means thinking Being as 
Time. Nietzsche thinks that thought but does not think it 
as the question of Being and Time. Plato and Aristotle 
also think that thought when they conceive Being as ousia 
(presence), but just as little as Nietzsche do they think it 
as a question (120). 
Heidegger completely misinterprets Nietzsche, manipulating his 
work to serve as merely an unwitting preface to his own work -
and alludes to the notion that somehow Nietzsche's work is devoid 
of substantial content unless it is seen in the light of Heidegger's 
analysis of being. 
The reason for this [Nietzsche failing to think the eternal 
return as a question of Being] is not that the thought 
remained in any way obscure to him, but that like all 
metaphysicians prior to him Nietzsche was unable to find 
his way back to the fundamental traits of the guiding 
metaphysical projection (III 164). 
But Nietzsche's project was something very different. Thus, he 
did not conceive of his project as 'the question of Being and Time' 
though Heidegger dogmatically insists he did and proceeds from 
this to reconstruct Nietzsche's unpublished writings according to 
this agenda. "...The book [The Will to Power] merely leads us to 
the threshold of the question, not yet into the question i tself (I 
21). Heidegger's misunderstanding of Nietzsche is explained by 
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the fact that his analysis is not the result of interpretation but of 
appropriation. 
It should further be noted that Heidegger 's analysis of 
Nietzsche makes great use of Nietzsche's unpublished notes, 
collected in the posthumous work The Will to Power. Heidegger 
argues, "If our knowledge were limited to what Nietzsche himself 
published, we could never learn what Nietzsche knew perfectly 
well, what he carefully prepared and continually thought through, 
yet withheld" (II 15). But on this point there are a number of 
important things one should take into consideration. First, 
Nietzsche, perhaps more so than any other philosopher, was acutely 
concerned with what he published. Add to this the fact that 
Nietzsche was a ferociously avid writer who frequently jotted notes 
during walks that very often amounted to little in his estimation. 
Nevertheless he felt a certain sentimental attachment to them and 
believed they still had value in documenting the journey of his 
thoughts. Thus he kept virtually all of them—including the ones 
he felt were not only wrong, but even ridiculous. Above all, 
however, one must take into consideration the fact that Nietzsche's 
use of irony and sarcasm makes it very easy to misinterpret him 
out of the context of the work in which they are contained. Thus, 
when we speak of his unpublished notes we simply cannot make 
any definitive conclusions about their meaning and are left 
dangerously susceptible to interpreting them within an imposed 
context of our own choosing. For these reasons, here is the 
proposed method for treating Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal 
return: give primacy to the published texts, determine the nature 
and function of the eternal return strictly within their domain, and 
then inspect The Will to Power to see if anything there is sufficient 
to refute or modify the previous determinations. Heidegger failed 
to properly understand the doctrine because, in contrast to this 
approach, his method was to construct the raw material of The 
Will to Power in accordance with his own project and interpret the 
rest of Nietzsche according to that construction such that Nietzsche 
was rendered a prelude to Heidegger's own work Being and Time. 
In light of this proposed method let us then answer Heidegger's 
question: 
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But even if we concede that here we have a contradiction 
which cannot be transcended and which compels us to 
decide in favor of either will to power or eternal recurrence, 
why does Baeumler then decide against Nietzsche's most 
difficult thought, the peak of his meditation, and for will 
to power (122)? 
There are many reasons for favoring the will to power over the 
eternal recurrence. Not only are "proofs" for its literal existence 
pathetic and easily refutable, they fly in the face of the rest of 
Nietzsche's philosophy. The proof is found in The Will to Power 
where Nietzsche says: 
If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity 
of force and as a certain definite number of centers of 
force... it follows that, in the great dice game of existence, 
it must pass through a calculable number of combinations. 
In infinite time, every possible combination would at some 
time or another be realized; more: it would be realized an 
infinite number of times (WP 1066). 
This however clashes with Nietzsche's refusal to accept the notion 
of atoms or any "definite number of centers of force." Rather, 
according to Nietzsche these are merely convenient modes of 
interpreting reality that in fact distort reality's true nature as a 
continual flux. "We operate only with things that do not exist: 
lines, planes... atoms... In truth we are confronted by a continuum 
out of which we isolate a couple of pieces (GS 112)." But even if 
Nietzsche believed reality was composed of finite atomistic 
components (which he clearly did not) this still would not prove 
the doctrine of the eternal return. As any mathematician will tell 
you, a finite set can still produce an infinite number of combinations 
and never need repeat. 
Moreover, the doctrine is logically inconsistent with other 
claims of Nietzsche's. Richard Howey observes: 
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If each event in every existence is but a repetition of a 
previous cycle, then everything is already determined 
including all the individual acts of Willing. If, then, we 
interpret the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence literally, there 
can never be a Superman, for Zarathustra himself says: 
'Never yet has there been an overman...' Clearly Nietzsche 
could not have meant the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence 
to be interpreted literally as absolute determinism. 
Ultimately Heidegger leaves this question suspended and 
says that Nietzsche never pursued the problem of these 
connections (Howey 96). 
Let us then appeal to Occam's Razor. Is it simpler to believe that 
a man as brilliant as Nietzsche overlooked an obvious contradiction 
within his philosophy and really believed in the soundness of such 
easily refuted arguments, or is the explanation simply that Nietzsche 
had other intentions with the doctrine than for it to be taken 
metaphysically literally? 
So if the doctrine of the eternal return cannot be taken 
metaphysically literally, does it follow, as Heidegger believes, that 
for anyone who subscribes to this: 
In the latter case [maintaining that the eternal return is 
metaphysically unsound] they explain the doctrine as an 
impossible eccentricity of Nietzsche's, something that can 
count only as a personal confession of faith and does not 
pertain to the system of Nietzsche's philosophy proper (II 
5). 
But is there another possibility? Just because the eternal return 
cannot be reconciled with Nietzsche's metaphysics, does it have 
no place in his philosophy? Is it then something that must be 
explained away in order to maintain the integrity of Nietzsche's 
philosophy? This follows only if one reduces Nietzsche to a 
metaphysician. But he was much more than this and his project 
cannot be understood on any single level—particularly a 
metaphysical one. One must take into account the psychological 
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aspects of Nietzsche's thought—something Heidegger utterly failed 
to do. If one does this, the eternal return can be reconciled with 
the will to power. But this endeavor should not be interpreted as 
apologizing for some deficiency of Nietzsche's thought; far from 
it, this reconciliation is the very road he intended the free spirit to 
walk—the greater truth of Nietzsche's thought is in fact revealed 
in this very reconciliation. Thus, the two doctrines can and must 
be unified, but not on a metaphysical level. The will to power is a 
metaphysical doctrine but the eternal return is not—it is a 
psychological one. Heidegger's mistake is that he tries to assimilate 
the two on equal footing within a purely ontological framework— 
this reveals the bias that prevented him from properly interpreting 
Nietzsche, and why he could only make Nietzsche intelligible 
within his own operative framework. 
So how then is the eternal return to be understood within 
Nietzsche's framework? To determine this, as previously discussed, 
the best method is to analyze it first according to how it is presented 
in Nietzsche's published works. In The Gay Science it's introduced 
as the heaviest burden: 
The greatest weight [heaviest burden]. - What, if some 
day or night a demon were to steal after you into your 
loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now 
live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more 
and innumerable times more... 
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your 
teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you 
once experienced a tremendous moment when you would 
have answered him: "You are a god and never have I heard 
anything more divine." If this thought gained possession 
of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush 
you. The question in each and every thing, "Do you desire 
this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie 
upon your actions as the greatest possible weight. Or how 
well disposed would you have to become to yourself and 
to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate 
eternal confirmation and seal (GS 341)? 
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The important question in uncovering the meaning of this passage 
is: what does Nietzsche mean by 'burden'—is this a metaphysical 
burden or psychological one? Considering that the focus of the 
passage is clearly on one's reaction to the eternal return, it seems 
obvious that it is offered as a thought experiment and not a 
metaphysical reality. Heidegger however falsely interprets the 
'burden' metaphysically: "The thought of eternal return is to be a 
burden - that is, is to be determinative—for our envelopment within 
beings as a whole" (II 22). In contrast to this erroneous 
interpretation of the eternal return, Milan Kundera in his book 
The Unbearable Lightness of Being, perfectly expresses the nature 
and significance of this 'burden.' 
If eternal return is the heaviest of burdens, then our lives 
can stand out against it in all their splendid lightness. But 
is heaviness truly deplorable and lightness splendid? The 
heaviest of burdens crushes us, we sink beneath it, it pins 
us to the ground. But in the love poetry of every age, the 
woman longs to be weighed down by the man's body. The 
heaviest of burdens is therefore simultaneously an image 
of life's most intense fulfillment. The heavier the burden, 
the closer our lives come to the earth, the more real and 
truthful they become. Conversely, the absolute absence 
of a burden causes man to be lighter than air, to soar into 
heights, take leave of the earth and his earthly being, and 
become only half real, his movements as free as they are 
insignificant... The only certainty is: the lightness/weight 
opposition is the most mysterious, most ambiguous of all 
(Kundera 5-6) 
It is this ambiguity that Nietzsche is playing with. As we shall 
see, it is in fact through this ambiguity that the significance of the 
eternal return - the reason it is the 'peak of meditation'—reveals 
itself. And this ambiguity is a psychological, not a metaphysical, 
phenomenon. 
The psychological interpretation of the eternal recurrence is 
further supported by the character of other published passages in 
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which it is discussed. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche says, 
"who wants to have it again as it was and is to all eternity, insatiably 
calling out da capo... (BGE 56). Then in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
Nietzsche says, "Courage, however, is the best slayer—courage 
which attacks: which slays even death itself, for it says, 'Was that 
life? Well then! Once more! 1 " (PN 269). In all three discussions 
it is again the reaction that matters—the eternal return is simply a 
means to this end; it's simply the litmus test for courage and life 
affirmation—the virtues of the Übermensch. 
But why is such a thought experiment necessary? To answer 
this one must examine the context of the work within which the 
doctrine is first presented by Nietzsche, The Gay Science. Consider 
first, however, Heidegger's description of the context of The Gay 
Science. 
Now we are better prepared to grasp the reason why 
Nietzsche communicates this demonic thought only at the 
conclusion of The Gay Science: what is referred to here at 
the conclusion is—in terms of the matter—not the end 
but the beginning of the "gay science," its commencement 
and its end alike. The matter in question is the eternal 
return of the same, which the "gay science" must come to 
know, first and last, if it is to be proper knowing. "Gay 
science" is for Nietzsche nothing other than the name for 
that "philosophy" which in its fundamental doctrine 
teaches the eternal return of the same (II21). 
For Heidegger the context just is the doctrine itself—that just is 
the "gay science." But Heidegger has completely neglected what 
is in fact the heart of the froelichen Wissenschaft—namely the death 
of God, which is the context of The Gay Science. It is within that 
context that the eternal return is to be understood—it is invoked to 
awaken us to the reality and weight of this truth. 
The eternal return is not a metaphysical reality but a 
psychological thought experiment designed to retrain us in the ways 
of life affirmation. It has only corrective application. How would 
you live if you knew it would be repeated forever? According to 
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Nietzsche, you should already be living your life in this manner 
and would if it wasn't for the corruption of Christianity and its 
creation of God and the 'other worldly' which reduce this world to 
a mere means. Thus one rejects the eternal return (and therefore 
negates life) to the extent that they affirm the next world—this 
rejection and life negation is a symptom of humanity's decadence. 
What? Is humanity itself decadent? Was it always?— 
What is certain is that it has been taught only decadent 
values as supreme values. The morality that would un-
self man is the morality of decline par excellence—the 
fact, "I am declining," transposed into the imperative, "all 
of you ought to dec l ine"—and not only into the 
imperative.—This is the only morality that has been taught 
so far, that of un-selfing, reveals a will to the end; 
fundamentally, it negates life (GM 333). 
Nietzsche sees his project as attempting to overcome the fall of 
humanity into this decadence—and the eternal return is designed 
to test the extent to which one has been affected and become 
"human all too human". It is designed to test one's life affirmation. 
Nietzsche created it simply to counteract the Christian doctrine of 
the next world. It was as if he was saying, "Ok, you have your 
dogmatic belief in the next world and now I will mock you with 
my dogmatic belief in the eternal return." The eternal return was 
conceived by Nietzsche simply in response to the doctrine of the 
next world. Where the next world is the doctrine of supreme life 
negation, Nietzsche sees the eternal return as the doctrine of life 
affirmation. Neither, however, is metaphysically true for Nietzsche, 
and if we had remained faithful to our instincts we would not have 
needed the eternal return in the first place. 
The death of God heralds a return to the instincts and life 
affirmation—but it's dangerous. Consider Dostoyevsky's claim, 
"Without God everything is permissible." In the wake of the death 
of God we are left with the burden of responsibility—where 'God' 
had formerly been the apparatus of our own devices by which we 
avoided this responsibility. 'God' was a concept born of the human 
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mind, for Nietzsche; therefore it can perish from the mind—or in 
other words, die. Previously God provided the weight for our 
existence; and to have his existence lifted would be too dramatic 
were it not for the eternal return to keep us grounded. The eternal 
return is now the heaviest burden which lends weight to actions 
(something already present in those who affirm life) and forces us 
to ask ourselves, "All may be permissible but what is it I wish to 
will—what would I will to repeat forever?" According to 
Nietzsche, this has been the question all along, for everything has 
always in fact been permissible, we have just sought refuge from 
this responsibility and burden, in the catacombs of Christian dogma 
and western metaphysics. The death of God (the realization that 
he was our own creation) shatters these illusions and makes life 
affirmation the new challenge. 
The overman is the meaning of the earth... I beseech you, 
my brothers, remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe 
those who speak to you of other-worldly hopes!... Once 
the sin against God was the greatest sin; but God died... 
To sin against the earth is now the most dreadful thing 
(PN 125). 
The eternal return is simply our means to this affirmation. It's 
Nietzsche's way of retraining the instincts—a noble lie that will 
help us navigate the dangerous waters of this transitional period 
back to our instincts without falling into the abyss of nihilism. We 
have become so dependent on God and divine law that giving it up 
would leave us in a very precarious position. As Nietzsche 
describes through Zarathustra, "Man is a rope, tied between beast 
and overman—a rope over an abyss. A dangerous across, a 
dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous 
shuddering and stopping" (PN 126). Zarathustra, with his doctrine 
of the eternal return, is meant to guide us through this treacherous 
existential journey and back to the instincts and life affirmation. 
How is affirmation to be attained then? By complete 
affirmation of a single moment which, if properly understood, 
simultaneously affirms the totality of all moments, and therefore, 
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all life making it the highest expression of the will to power. In so 
far as one is living for the future they are betraying and negating 
the present. And why would one be living only for the future? 
Answer: because they are incapable of handling the suffering that 
attends and is intertwined with the present. This immaturity is 
then amplified by doctrines of the next world—where one is no 
longer even living for tomorrow, but for the next world. When 
this has occurred one has negated life out of an inability to handle 
suffering. Thus, Nietzsche observes, the eternal return forces one 
to confront their suffering since it will return and live on eternally. 
This makes it the most horrible thought for those who have sought 
refuge in the next world. The eternal return awakens one to the 
fact that not only is all life imbued with suffering, so is all joy. 
"As deeply as man sees into life, he also sees into suffering" (PN 
269). Thus, affirming a single moment, affirming the present, 
brings with it affirmation of all life with the understanding that 
everything is inseparably intertwined—joy in suffering and 
suffering in joy. 
Consider, for example, an analogy from music. The cadence 
of a piece of music does not, so to speak, "do away with" all the 
notes that came prior to it. It does not stand alone, but is made 
significant simply by subsuming the prior movements of harmony, 
and resolutions of dissonance, in a final culmination. That is, its 
value and beauty lies, not in itself, but in its relationship to both 
consonance and discord—in itself it is meaningless and 
aesthetically uninteresting. The true significance of, say, the 
infamous Tristan Chord, therefore, is contained, not within itself, 
but within the entirety of Wagner's Tristan and Isolde—its apparent 
autonomy is merely an illusion in so far as its aesthetic value is 
concerned. Thus, a piece of music does not "do away with" discord, 
or move beyond it, but resolves and overcomes discord. To apply 
this to life then, Nietzsche's charge against Christianity is that, 
with its doctrine of "the next world," it is continually trying to "do 
away with" the past and with suffering in a futile, but destructive, 
attempt to isolate and abstract pure joy (i.e. heaven and eternal 
bliss). The danger of Christianity, therefore, is that it is mature 
enough to recognize the beauty of the Tristan Chord but too 
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Therefore, Amor fati, not the eternal return, is the essence of 
Nietzsche's philosophy. And it expresses itself completely in "da 
immature to handle its beauty. The doctrine of the eternal return, 
therefore, is designed to force one to confront their sufferings rather 
than flee from them into tomorrow or the next world, and for the 
first time be able, not merely to recognize joy, but handle it. Only 
in so doing is one able to truly appreciate the full significance of 
their joys—joys which are, ironically, negated if one attempts to 
isolate and flee to them out of immature lust. Interestingly enough, 
to carry the analogy one step further, is the value and significance 
of a piece of music not measured by the very degree to which it 
cries out "da capo! "? 
Thus, joy and suffering are contained within one another and 
cannot truly be isolated. As Geldard described in relation to 
Heraclitus' flux, "My joy contains sorrow even before its sweetness 
can be fully savored." Since life is unified in the eternal flux of 
things, one can only affirm their joy by simultaneously accepting 
their suffering. This is the reality that the eternal return reminds 
us of; it simply will not allow one to escape their suffering, and 
points out that by trying to escape it one is merely betraying their 
joys - living for the next world may sedate one to suffering, but it 
also sedates them to fully experiencing joy. According to Nietzsche 
this was understood instinctively until it was corrupted by 
Christianity with its beliefs in the next world out of an inability to 
handle suffering, and therefore also joy—and therefore also life 
itself. The eternal return is simply a synthetic way to mimic that 
instinctive understanding and usher in the possibility of genuine 
life affirmation. As Nietzsche artfully describes in Zarathustra: 
Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? O my friends, 
then you said Yes too to all woe. All things are entangled, 
ensnared, enamored; if ever you wanted one thing twice, 
if ever you said, "You please me, happiness! Abide, 
moment!" then you wanted all back. All anew, all eternally, 
all entangled, ensnared, enamored—oh, then you loved 
the world (PN 435). 
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capö"—and through them life is affirmed in the moment by 
embracing the whole of one's existence through a single justifying 
joy. This is life affirmation, and this is Nietzsche's project in the 
wake of the death of God—and this is all sadly overlooked by 
Heidegger. The eternal return is significant simply as the first 
step—a corrective step—towards the ultimate ideal of life 
affirmation expressed in Amorfati. 
Thus, ironically it is the metaphysical paradox of the will to 
power and the eternal return that conveys the ultimate truth. Once 
one has become strong enough to see the paradox and the conflict 
of the will to power and the eternal return, they will at that moment 
have no more use for the doctrine of the eternal return. For it was 
nothing more than a psychological apparatus used to get them to 
this point; but now it can be jettisoned and, for the first time, the 
full breadth of the will to power can be seen and actualized in 
living, for the first time, not for the next world or even tomorrow, 
but for the moment—a moment which unifies the whole of one's 
existence. It is only in such a state that one can manifest the will 
to power and experience the full reality of their joys. This is why 
Nietzsche emphasized the thought as much as he did—it opened 
one up to truth on so many levels. The eternal return is thus revealed 
as a mockery of projects of immortality, which conveys its truth in 
a sublime irony. It lies at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy as a 
paradigmatic representative of his sometimes elusive but always 
potent method. A method which never delineates truth outright, 
but reveals itself internally, between the lines by cleverly forcing 
one, in the spirit of Heraclitus, to "search their nature"—a method 
which escapes Heidegger entirely, and is completely lost in 
Heidegger's metaphysical analysis of the eternal return. In the 
words of Richard Howey: 
The "coherence" of Nietzsche's philosophy is intelligible 
only insofar as we understand the notion of Eternal 
Recurrence dialectically as the attempt to provide a bridge 
between the two essentially irreconcilable perspectives of 
life and cosmology. Heidegger ' s very method of 
proceeding is, of necessity, frustrated by the most 
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fundamental character of Nietzsche 's approach to 
philosophy. (Howey 97) 
Perhaps the best insight into understanding Nietzsche's philosophy 
can be found in Heraclitus' aphorism: "They do not apprehend 
how being in conflict it still agrees with itself; there is an opposing 
coherence, as in the tensions of the bow and lyre" (Geldard 157). 
Whenever Nietzsche's thought appears prima facie to conflict with 
itself, a coherence often opens up by looking deeper and, in that 
movement, reveals its truth. 
In conclusion, in the published works of Nietzsche's, the eternal 
return is clearly presented as a psychological thought experiment, 
not a metaphysical reality—the only evidence to support taking it 
literally to be found in the unpublished notes of The Will to Power, 
and there only a hint; hardly enough to refute the psychological 
interpretation especially considering that such an interpretation 
conveniently puts Nietzsche in line with Heidegger's own project. 
Moreover such an interpretation at best compromises other aspects 
of Nietzsche's philosophy and at worst flies in the face of them, 
and is achieved only by viewing Nietzsche through the lens of a 
single unpublished note; add to this the fact that such an 
interpretation is based on a radical and unjustified reinterpretation 
of Heraclitus when there is no evidence that Nietzsche subscribed 
to such an interpretation—while the non-literal interpretation can 
not only be harmonized with the rest of Nietzsche' thought but in 
fact reveals the very essence of his philosophy—and the evidence 
is overwhelming that Heidegger is not only wrong but guilty of 
nothing less than reckless and dangerous scholarship. 
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